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Modeling and Forecasting the Malawi Kwacha-US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate 
By  
Kisu Simwaka ∗ 
Research & Statistics Department 
Abstract 
This study develops a blended version of the monetary and portfolio models for the MK/USD exchange 
rate, and assesses the forecasting performance of the model against a simple random walk. The results 
indicate that the model performs better than the simple random walk on the 6, 12 and 24 months forecasting 
horizons. However, the model does not perform well on the 3-month horizon, which is supported by theory 
suggesting that exchange rate movements are not driven by fundamentals in the short term.  
We also add a variable drift term to the random walk process and compare its performance against both the 
simple random walk and the fundamental model. The results show that random walk (with a variable drift) 
performs better than the other models in out-of-sample process at both short term and long term horizons. 
This result suggests that this (the random walk with a drift) process might be the best tool for exchange rate 
forecasting on all the forecast horizons. When it comes to exchange rate forecasting in the long term, a 
fundamental model might still be the best alternative.  
 
Regarding the structural model (with fundamental determinants of nominal exchange rate), the empirical 
results indicate that a worsening current account balance and decreases in net external flows result the 
depreciation of exchange rates. This is in line with practical experience.  
On the other hand, higher domestic interest rates have an insignificant impact on exchange rate. In an 
economy with several structural bottlenecks and poor infrastructural services, high interest rates cannot be 
expected to induce capital flows.   A rise in domestic inflation is associated with a deprecated exchange 
rate. Lastly, consistent with theoretical expectations, another significant finding is that an easing in 
monetary policy (increase in money supply growth) is associated with a depreciation of the exchange rate. 
 
                                                 
∗ The author is a Senior Economist in the Research and Statistics Department of the Reserve Bank of 
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These findings lead us to make the following conclusions. Developments in the current account balance 
have implications on the exchange rate market. Measures aimed at improving the current account position, 
for example through exports, are also instrumental in stabilizing the exchange rate – through appreciation. 
Considering that Malawi has been traditionally depending on tobacco as its chief foreign exchange earner, 
and taking into account the anti-smoking campaign militating against the crop amidst low prices, it is 
imperative that Malawi should diversify into other foreign exchange earner (for instance tourism) in order 
to ensure macroeconomic stability, which itself is a pre-requisite for economic growth and therefore poverty 
reduction.  Thus, policies that influence exports and imports of goods and services also determine exchange 
rate movements. Likewise, prospects concerning funding for a donor aid dependent economy like ours may 
influence the direction of market forces in determining the exchange rate movements. Big swings in 
external funding could cause instability Therefore, government’s credibility regarding the use of external 
public funds and implementation of related reforms is important in as far as stability of the foreign 
exchange market and overall macroeconomic stability are concerned.  
 
The insignificant impact of higher domestic interest on attracting capital flows calls for the need for 
government to address some structural bottlenecks. For instance, infrastructure services such road network 
and utilities (electricity and water supply) require improvement. Otherwise, currently, Malawi needs lower 
interest rates in order to reduce the cost of credit necessary for private sector development.  
The general picture from the results is that developments in the external sector of the economy, which are 
not under the ambit of domestic authorities, probably contributed more to fluctuations of the Malawi 
kwacha.  If indeed the above diagnosis is accurate, the policy implications of government’s ability in 
influencing the behavior of the exchange rate is limited. This is because the ability of a small economy like 
that of Malawi to fully insulate itself from external shocks is constrained. It will mainly be confined to 
limiting the contributions of inconsistencies in domestic policy and administering some confidence building 
measures, at least in the short-term-to medium term  
 
It is worthy to note that divergent opinions exist as to the usefulness of devaluation (or depreciation) as a 
policy tool. There are those that believe devaluation as a policy tool can boost exports and so crate jobs. It 
should be noted however that since the kwacha was floated in 1994, it has been on a depreciating trend 
almost continuously without corresponding gains from the export sector. Without losing sight of the interest 
of exporters, it should be noted that a depreciated kwacha has implications in terms of increased import 
expenditures (oil import bill), government debt service, domestic inflation and cost of imported 
intermediate inputs. In the short term, what we should strive as a nation is to have a stable Malawi kwacha 
exchange rate. In the long run, the viable option is in ensuing a competitive export market is increased 
productivity among exporting firms. This may include export diversification and implementing measures to 
limit market imperfections. 
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1. Introduction  
Given the small and import dependent nature of the Malawi economy, exchange rate 
is undistiputably one of the most important macroeconomic variable. Movements in 
exchange rate have significant pass-through effects to consumer prices. The Malawi 
kwacha has depreciated almost continuously since it was floated in February 1994.  
This movement in the exchange rate has left analysts, policy makers and exchange 
market agents disturbed. The stability of the nominal exchange rate plays a significant 
role in the successful performance of the economy.  
One of the key issues dominating literature is whether exchange rates can be 
predicted. The low ability to predict exchange rate movements appears to reveal a 
huge need for further research on the issue. Understanding the forecasting of 
exchange rate behaviour is important to monetary policy. More importantly, because 
of the thinness and volatility of the foreign exchange market, the policy makers focus 
on the information content of the short-term picture. That is, while the medium to 
long-term outlook is important, policy makers are also concerned about exchange rate 
movements in the very short run in deciding intervention policy. Despite the 
compelling facts, little has been done to understand the dynamism and identify those 
major economic fundamentals that drive the movement of the kwacha. This paper 
attempts to fill this gap. This paper thus attempts to estimate and forecast the Malawi 
kwacha-US dollar nominal exchange rate model using the Johansen (1988) 
cointegration technique. This will help in identifying the sources of nominal exchange 
rate fluctuations and also help in making short run forecasts for the exchange rate. The 
nominal exchange rate is of interest as it is more visible and therefore practical to the 
ordinary public than the real exchange rate. 
The subsections immediately following provide background to the study and 
evolution of exchange rate policy in Malawi. Section 3 provides a brief review of 
literature. Section 4 provides the analytical methodology while section 5 provides the 
empirical results. The conclusion in section 6 summarizes the policy lessons and 
options. 
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2.0  Exchange Rate Policy in Malawi 
2.1 Evolution of the Exchange Rate 
 
Malawi’s exchange rate1 has evolved over time responding to the economic  
circumstances that have prevailed at particular times. The management of the 
exchange rate in Malawi has been pursued with three major policy objectives in  
mind. These are: 
i. Maintenance of a sustainable balance of payments position 
ii. attainment of stable domestic prices 
iii. Attainment of growth in real income 
We periodize exchange rate developments as follows; 
2.1.1 1965 to January 1973 
From 1965 to January 1973, Malawi operated within the sterling zone with the 
Malawi pound, later changed to Malawi kwacha in 1971, pegged at par to the British 
pound sterling. In November 1967, the British sterling was devalued by 14 percent 
and the Malawi pound followed suit by the same magnitude. During the same period 
the economy grew impressively and the balance of payments position was 
remarkable.  
With the collapse of the gold standard par value system the major currencies, the 
British sterling included, in the currency market became very volatile as these 
currencies shifted from pegging to the gold to a generalized floating system. From 
November 1973 to June 1975, the Malawi kwacha was pegged to a trade weighted 
basket of the Pound and the US dollar. The Reserve Bank took an active exchange 
rate policy with announcements of devaluations and setting the daily buying and 
selling rates of the US dollar and the British pound sterling.  
 
                                                 
1 This passage relies heavily on material from the RBM website 
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2.1.2 June 1975 to 1984 
There were persistent fluctuations in the two currencies, leading to authorities seeking 
a more permanent peg and the kwacha was pegged to the SDR in June 1975 until 
1984. This allowed the kwacha some measure of stability until early 1980s when the 
SDR started appreciating rapidly in tandem with appreciation of the dollar, forcing 
authorities to devalue the local currency against the SDR by 15 and 12 percent on 24 
April 1982 and 17 September 1983, respectively. The situation was exacerbated by 
external and internal shocks that rocked the Malawi economy, further worsening the 
country’s terms of trade. Because of the continued appreciation of the SDR, and the 
fact that the SDR did not properly represent the currencies of Malawi’s trading 
partners, the authorities decided to add the South African rand to the SDR basket in 
January 1984. Following this peg, the main thrust was to maintain external 
competitiveness by ensuring that real exchange rate (RER) was not appreciating. This 
was achieved by periodic devaluations of the kwacha especially that the rate of 
inflation in Malawi remained higher than that of trading partners’ currencies such as 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia and also due unfavourable movements in 
relative prices.  
2.1.3 January 1984 to February 1994 
From January 1984 through to February 1994, in an effort to recover from the 
worsening balance of payments position, the authorities pegged the kwacha to a trade 
weighted basket of seven currencies. The signs of recovery were manifested by 
improvements if the balance of payments position from –11.8 percent of GDP in 1983 
to –1.7 percent in 1984, but these were short-lived as increased transportation costs 
led to further deterioration in terms of trade. This resulted in authorities taking a series 
of active exchange rate policy stance. On April 2, 1984, the kwacha was devalued by 
15 percent, followed by further devaluations by 10 percent on August 16, 1986, 20 
percent on February 7, 1987; 15 percent on January 16, 1988; 7 percent on March 24, 
1990; 15 percent on 28 March 1992; and further 22 percent on July 11, 1992. 
Progressively, it became apparent that the exchange rate was becoming heavily 
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politicized, with each devaluation becoming subject of intense speculation within the 
private sector. That led to weakening the level of confidence in the exchange system, 
and consequently a marked slowdown in repatriation of export proceeds. The situation 
was worsened by the cut in non-humanitarian assistance by bilateral donors and 
suspension of balance of payments support in 1992 because of governance issues.  
 
2.1.4 The Floatation of the kwacha 
 
In February 1994 Malawi adopted a managed float exchange rate regime.  This was 
aimed at resolving the foreign exchange crisis that had hit the country due to 
suspension of balance of payments support from donors, and the lagged effects of the 
1992/93 drought. The switch from the fixed regime to the floating one was meant to 
achieve certain objectives which can be summed up as: 
i. Improvement of the country’s export competitiveness, 
ii. Provision of an efficient foreign exchange allocation mechanism 
iii. Dampen speculative attacks on the Kwacha. Prior to the floatation, 
devaluations had become more frequent and very predictable thereby 
making the whole system very unstable. 
iv. Restoration of investor and donor confidence. The country’s foreign 
reserves had dwindled to such low levels that it was difficult to do 
business with the rest of the world. 
As a step towards market determination of the exchange rate, the monetary authorities 
authorized creation of a foreign exchange market administered by the RBM where 
weekly auctions of the foreign exchange market would take place. Buyers of the 
foreign exchange would bid through the commercial banks the price at which they 
wanted to buy a certain amount of foreign exchange. In the same way, sellers would 
determine their selling price and amounts. Successful bidders would then pay their 
bidding prices and not the clearing rate.  This, therefore, was adoption of a managed 
float exchange rate regime. Consequently, the exchange rate of the Kwacha against 
the US dollar depreciated from around K4.5 to over K17 during the period February 
to September 1994.  
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2.1.5 1995 to 1998 
During the period 1995-97 the exchange rate fluctuated within a very narrow fixed 
band and accordingly foreign reserves were used to support the exchange rate. The 
main objective of attaining low inflation rates was achieved towards the end of 1997 
but at the expense of huge foreign exchange reserves and high interest rates, which 
were used to support the exchange rate.  Consequently, the real exchange rate 
appreciated and had a negative impact on the current account balance.  In other words 
the current account imbalance that emerged during the period of fixed exchange rates 
was being covered by a run down of reserves. 
 
 After achieving the inflation objective during 1997, the target of the monetary 
authorities was then to revive the lost competitiveness within a reasonable period of 
time.  It soon became clear that the narrow band had to be abandoned in favour of an 
unannounced crawling peg. During this period, the authorities were not committed to 
defend the currency thus the central parity rate was adjusted every time the maximum 
level (i.e. the upper limit of the band) was reached. Thus between 1997 and 1998 the 
exchange rate moved from around K15 to K38 to the US dollar. 
 
2.1.6 1998 to 2003 
This adjustment in the exchange rate brought back some competitiveness in the 
country’s foreign trade.  Consequently, the system was abandoned towards the end of 
1998 and the exchange rate started operating in a more market fashion – i.e. the ‘free-
floating’ system. This system saw Authorized Dealer Banks taking a more active role 
in determining the path for the Kwacha.  Consequently, and in part owing to the heavy 
depreciation of the kwacha in August, 1998, the kwacha dropped against the dollar by 
over 100.0 percent between January and December of that year. Developments in the 
exchange rates during 1999 reflected several factors, first ample supply of foreign 
exchange made possible by a health tobacco season which contributed to the relative 
stability of the currency. Second, mid-way, into the year, speculation about another 
possible devaluation of the kwacha died down, enabling the currency to remain 
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relatively stable. Third, the donor inflows, though lower than expected, also 
contributed much to the stability of the kwacha as these supported the foreign 
exchange reserve position. Finally, the recovery in the countries affected by the Asian 
crisis also helped achieve stability in the exchange rate as currencies of major trading 
partners stabilized. Notwithstanding these positive developments, the kwacha also 
came under pressure as the inflation differential between Malawi and her trading 
partners increased. In addition, the seasonal increase in demand for foreign exchange 
towards the end of the year also exerted a downward pressure on the currency. 
Reflecting these developments, the external value of the Malawi kwacha dropped by 
6.5 percent against the US dollar between January and December, 1999. In 1999, the 
kwacha also depreciated by 4.1 percent against the British pound and 17.4 percent 
against the Japanese yen. Over the same period, the kwacha appreciated in relation to 
the Euro, largely owing to the latter’s weakening vis-à-vis other currencies. The 
external value of the kwacha weakened substantially in 2000 particularly starting the 
second quarter of the year. Several factors accounted for this development, both 
external and domestic. On the international scene, one of the factors is the growth in 
the US economy which resulted into strengthening of the US dollar against all major 
currencies. Subsequently, the Malawi kwacha weakened in attempt to maintain its 
competitiveness. On the domestic front, the collapse of tobacco prices at the auction 
floors had an adverse impact on the country’s reserve position. This together with the 
hoarding of foreign currency by some exporters and non-receipt of pledged donor 
support led to scarcity of foreign exchange on the market thereby putting pressure on 
the kwacha. Thus by end December, 2000, the external nominal value of the kwacha 
weakened by about 38.0 percent from the value observed at the end of 1999.  
The free-float system, is perhaps remembered by the first ever appreciation of the 
Kwacha in 2001. Receipt of some donor inflows at the beginning of 2001 coupled 
with relatively higher average tobacco prices at the auction floor meant a favourable 
healthy foreign exchange position and this helped to dampen any speculative attacks 
on the kwacha. The kwacha consequently managed to firm up against most of other 
currencies. Similarly, the kwacha gained 18.3 percent, 19.9 percent and 26.6 percent 
against the British Pound, the Euro and Japanese Yen, respectively to reach K97.64 
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per pound, K59.56 per euro and K0.51 per yen. Thus at the end of 2001, the kwacha 
contrary to most speculative sentiments, settled at a modest K67.29 per US dollar 
when viewed against the rate of K80.08 per US dollar at the end of 2000.  
 
A short period of exchange rate instability followed. In 2002, developments on both 
the local and international scene adversely affected the nominal value of the Malawi 
kwacha against the currencies of other trading partners. On the domestic market, 
despite improved receipts of from tobacco sales as compared to 2001, low donor 
inflows impacted negatively on the country’s reserve position. On the international 
scene, the United States economy performed below its projected growth with 
significant drop in the second quarter of year. As a result, the dollar weakened against 
other hard currencies, notably the Euro and the British pound. Consequently, by the 
end of December 2002, the Malawi kwacha had shed 29. 5 percent against the US 
dollar to close the year at K87.14 per dollar. Similarly the kwacha weakened against 
the Euro and the Japanese yen by 53.4 percent and 43.3 percent to K91.36 per euro 
and K0.70 per yen, respectively. Against the British pound, the kwacha slid to 
K139.73 per pound from K97.64 per pound as at end December 2001. 
2.1.7 2003 to 2005  
A policy decision was taken in August 2003 to stabilize the Kwacha at a rate of K108 
against the United States dollar. The decision was in response to serious economic 
disequilibrium or instability following the suspension of the first IMF PRGF and the 
resultant droughts in the early 2000s. 
The kwacha –US dollar remained largely unchanged from August 2003 until mid-
March 2005 when a series of adjustments saw the Kwacha resting at K123 against the 
United States dollar. The stability of the kwacha during the larger part of 2004 was as 
a result of the involvement of the Reserve Bank of Malawi in buying United States 
dollars direct from farmers at the auction floors. This arrangement was necessitated by 
the misunderstanding that arose between tobacco farmers and the commercial banks 
regarding delays in crediting the farmers’ accounts after the sale of their tobacco and 
the exchange rate used in the conversions. This arrangement was, however, not 
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normal as it was not in keeping with the liberalized foreign exchange regime Malawi 
adopted in 1994. However, in view of the importance of the tobacco industry in the 
country, and in the face of a deadlock between farmers and the commercial banks, the 
Reserve Bank had to step in to save the situation. The Kwacha then stabilized at those 
levels until early 2006, when economic conditions necessitated a further review2. 
 
Figure 1: Daily exchange rates (2002-2005) 
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    2.1.8 The Current Exchange Rate Policy (2006 to date) 
The current managed float exchange rate system was adopted in response to many 
economic challenges like persistent excess demand for foreign exchange, frequent 
droughts and market failures, among others, which rendered the free float system 
ineffective.  The exchange rate is aligned with major objectives, that is, maintaining a 
sustainable BoP position, attaining stable domestic prices    and attainment of growth 
in real income. It is the intention of monetary authorities to place more reliance on 
market based instruments in regulating the kwacha’s value. However, moral suasion 
would be used if deemed necessary. It is not surprising therefore to see the kwacha on 
a weakening voyage – depreciating against all major currencies in May to average 
                                                 
2 Currently, the Reserve Bank is no longer involved in the purchase of dollars from farmers on the auction 
floors. This follows an agreement between the two parties after their Reserve Bank-brokered discussions 
earlier this year. The farmers are now able to get their proceeds within 24 hours of the sale documents being 
submitted to their bankers and the exchange rate used in the conversion is the one displayed on the day of 
the sale.  
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K138.75 (K134.74 in April 2006) against the US dollar, K22.45 (K22.24 in April 
2006) against the South African rand, and K176.61 (K165.03 in April 2006) against 
the Euro.    
3.0 Literature Review 
 
3.1 The Exchange rate Models 
 
This section discusses the purchasing power parity and the monetary models of exchange 
rate. We begin by defining a simple statistical process known as a random walk. Section 
3.1.1 defines this process and discusses how it can be used to represent the exchange rate. 
In section 3.1.2, the concept of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is introduced. Section 
3.1.3 introduces the monetary model of exchange rate and section 3.2 contains a short 
review of the relevant literature. 
 
3.1.1 The random walk with a variable drift 
We compare the forecasts with a random walk which we define as follows; 
ext =  ex t-1 + еt        [1] 
and adding a drift variable term to the simple random walk process gives following: 
ext =ut +  ex t-1 +εt        [2] 
where 
 ut = ut-1+ vt          [3] 
and ext is nominal exchange rate. The error terms εt,, еt and vt are white noise processes 
and should be independent and normally distributed. The term ut defines the drift and ex 
is the exchange rate. If ut would be a time dependent constant, we would have a normal 
random walk with a drift. The residual time series,  εt and vt  are estimated using a kalmer 
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filter on time series data of exchange rate and the drift variable is computed from 
equation.a  
3.1.2 The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Hypothesis 
There are two forms of PPP and these are absolute PPP and relative PPP. The absolute 
PPP hypothesis states that the exchange rate between the currencies of two countries 
should equal the ratio of the price levels of the two countries. In logarithmic form, this is 
written as: 
ex = p – p*         [4] 
where ex is the nominal exchange rate measured in units of domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency, p is the domestic price level and p* is the foreign price level. All 
variables in logarithms. The relative PPP hypothesis on the other hand states that the 
exchange rate should be proportionate to the ratio of the price level. Again, which again 
in logarithmic form, is stated as 
ex =k + p – p*        [5]  
where k is a constant parameter. Since information on national price level is normally 
available in the form of price indices, absolute PPP may be difficult to test empirically.  
Thus we will use the relative PPP for the study in this paper, in line with earlier empirical 
studies. The PPP does not make any general assertion about the direction of Causality 
between the variables. It only states the relationship. Causality between prices and the 
exchange rate might very well run in both directions. The exchange rate may respond to a 
change in the ratio of national price levels, while exchange rate depreciation might feed 
inflation. 
3.1.3 The Monetary Models of Exchange rate 
Literature is awash with versions of monetary models of exchange rate determination all 
of which extensions of the basic Frenkel (1976) as well as Dornbusch’s (1976) sticky-
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price model. A reduced form specification of the models that has been widely employed 
when testing these models is stated as: 
Ext =β0 + β1 (m-m*) + β2(y – y*) + β3(r – r*) + β4 (π – π*) + β5 (CA) + ε  [6] 
Where Ex is exchange rate, m-m* is money supply differential, y – y*is income 
differential, r – r* is interest rate differential, π – π* is inflation differential, and CA is 
current account balance, variables with asterisk (*) represent foreign country variables. 
.3.2 Brief Review of Empirical Evidence 
There is huge empirical literature concerning forecasting nominal exchange rates using 
structural macro-econometric models over the recent floating rate period. The general 
consensus emerging from literature is that exchange rate movements are difficult to 
forecast at short horizons, although there exist some evidence of long horizon 
predictability. The most influential negative empirical evidence was documented by 
Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b). These evaluated the forecasting performance of a 
variety of structural macroeconomic models of nominal exchange rate determination. 
Their finding was that no existing structural model could consitently forecast better than 
the naïve alternative of a random walk at short horizons, even when forecasts were 
generated conditional on observed maceroeconomic fundamentals. It follows that nominal 
exchange rate movements are difficult to rationalise on the basis of movements in 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The exchange rate forecasting puzzle has never been 
resolved despite numerous attempts to do so and a random walk has since become the 
standard benchmark for evaluating the forecasting performance of structural models of 
nominal exchange rate determination.  
At the time of Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b) conducted their forecast performance 
evaluation exercise, the principal structural model was the monetary model, which 
remains influential in the analysis of target zones and balance of payments crises. The 
monetary model of nominal exchange rate determination consists of conditions 
characterizing equilibrium in the money, bond, and output markets.  In the version of the 
monetary model developed by Frankel (1976) and Mussa (1976), output market 
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equilibrium is characterized under flexible prices, while the version of the monetary 
model developed by Dornbusch (19760 postulates that output market equilibrium under 
sticky prices.  
More recently, Cheung et al (2003) argue that the dollar and euro fluctuations cannot be 
explained by traditional models proposed during the 1970s. They point out that the recent 
exchange rate movements can only be explained by empirical and theoretical results 
linked to such variables as the positions of external assets, the real exchange rate and the 
productivity differentials. They also argue that the forecasting performance of this new set 
of models (proposed during the 1990s) have not been systematically evaluated.  
4.0 Methodology 
We use a blended version of the monetary and portfolio models. The model, which is 
different from the traditional sticky price monetary model (SPMM), is based on a 
specification form pioneered by Frankel (1979). He argued that in the short run, as in the 
SPMM model, prices are sticky and thus PPP does not hold continuously. Frankel 
reworked the basic assumptions of the original Dornbusch model to account for 
differences in secular rates of inflation.  
 
LNext =Σθ1i Lrd t-i Σθ2iLpd t-i +Σθ3icab t-i + Σθ4iLm2 t-i + Σθ5ineit-i + εi        [7] 
 
Where: Lex= logarithm of nominal exchange rate; Lrd is logarithm of interest rate 
differential, computed using the 91-day Treasury bill rate and short term London 
Interbank Offer (LIBOR); Lpd is logarithm of price differential, computed as the 
difference between the domestic price index and the US wholesale price index; LM2 is 
the logarithm of money supply; cab is current account balance as a proportion of nominal 
(quarterly)) GDP; and Nei is net external public inflows (official inflows and outflows) as 
a proportion of nominal GDP. Variables that are not in logs contain negative values that 
cannot be logged.  
Therefore, equation 7 parameters are reset into equation 8 with the error correction terms 
in brackets. 
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∆Lext =Σθ1i ∆rd t-i + Σθ2i∆Lpd t-i +Σθ3icab t-i + Σθ4i∆Lm2 t-i + Σθ5i∆nei t-i +Σθ6iLNE t-1 + 
θ 7[Lex –α1Lrd – α2Lpd –α3Lm2] + µi        [8] 
    4. 1  Empirical Results  
We start off by testing the variables for unit root using the two main unit root tests, 
namely Philips-Perron and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. The results of unit rot tests are 
summarized in table 1.  
Table 1. Unit root tests: Philips-Perron and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
 
Variable PP Value 
(Intercept) 
ADF 
Value 
(Intercept)
PP Value 
(Intercept & 
Trend) 
ADF Value 
(Intercept & 
Trend) 
Order of 
 
Integration
ex 
 
∆ex 
-1.246974 
(-2.9303) 
-5.030934 
-1.533784 
(-2.9320) 
-3.608720 
-2.160073 
(-3.5162) 
-5.080513 
-2.609958 
(-3.5189) 
-3.743311 
 
 
I(1) 
ird 
 
∆ird 
-2.313162 
(-2.9303) 
-5.680410 
-2.568050 
(-2.9320) 
-5.447708 
-2.524452 
(-2.9320) 
-5.608682 
-2.776547 
(-3.5189) 
-5.374622 
 
 
I(1) 
pd 
 
∆pd 
-.246974 
(-2.9303) 
-5.030934 
3.951245 
(-2.9320) 
 
-1.862771 
(-3.5162) 
-6.374077 
-2.856991 
(-3.5189) 
-6.211325 
 
 
I(1) 
cab 
 
∆cab 
-.246974 
(-2.9303 
-5.030934 
-1.650039 
(-2.9320) 
-8.273713 
-5.348617 
(-3.5162) 
 
-3.875493 
(-3.5189) 
 
 
 
I(1) 
m2 
 
∆m2 
-.246974 
(-2.9303 
-5.030934 
-1.077192 
(-2.9320) 
-10.18504 
-3.614962 
(-3.5162) 
 
-4.64843 
(-3.5189) 
 
 
 
I(1) 
nef -5.006141 
(-2.9303) 
 
-3.835961 
(-2.9320) 
 
-6.120700 
(-3.5162) 
-5.245342 
(-3.5189) 
 
I(0) 
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The figures in brackets are McKinnon critical values for rejection of unit root at 
conventional 5 percent level of significance.  The variables are tested at significant at 5 
percent level of significance. The results indicate that variables such as exchange rate, 
money supply, interest rate differential, price differential and trade balance are non-
stationary (integrated of order one) and thus become stationary after first difference. On 
the other hand, only net external inflows are stationary (integrated of order zero). The 
results lead us to the conclusion that trade balance, money supply, price and interest 
differential are non-stationary and integrated of the first order. 
Having found that the exchange rate, trade balance, money supply, price and interest 
differential are integrated of the first order, the variables are then tested for cointegration. 
The results of Johansen cointegration are reported in table 2. 
 Table 2: The Johansen Co-integration Test  
            
Eigen 
values 
Likelihood 
ratio 
5% Critical 
value 
1% 
Critical 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
0.626006 88.59678 68.52 76.07 None** 
04.38565 47.28915 47.21 54.46 At most 1* 
0.283958 23.04429 29.68 35.65 At most 2 
0.193177 9.015319 15.41 20.04 At most 3 
6.56E-06 0.000276 3.76 6.65 At most 4 
 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5 percent (1 percent) significance 
level. 
Results from cointegration test in table 2 indicate that there is one cointegrating vector at 
5 percent significance level. This allows us to proceed with the determination of the 
longrun relationships between cointegrated variables through an ECM formulation.  
Based on the PPP condition, domestic and foreign prices are incorporated individually in 
the ECM instead of using price differential as a variable. This is in tandem with 
theoretical debate that PPP is likely to hold only in the very long run (Ndung’u 2000). 
Thus ECM is formulated using the interest differential, money supply, domestic and 
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foreign prices and exchange rate. This enables us to obtain a cointegrating vector of the 
form:  
ecm= ex - 0.107826rd -4.4394m2 +1.359217pm + 20.62258pusa - 0.071040cab – 
78.3160        [16] 
 
The regression results of the error correction model specified in equation 8 incorporate 
the error correction term in equation 9. The regression results are reported in subsection 
4.2  
4.2  Estimation of the error Correction Models 
 
We now proceed to the third step of in the Engle Granger methodology, the estimation of 
the error correction model. The estimation data range from 1993:1 to 2003:4. Table 3 
shows the preferred model after eliminating the various lags to obtain a parsimonious 
model. 
Table 3. The exchange rate regression results 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  t-ratio 
Constant  -0.043611  0.027383  -1.592617 
∆ex (-1)  0.297962  0.133125  2.238214  
∆ird (-4)  -0.062952  0.052293  -1.203816 
∆pd    0.517846  0.078851  6.567364  
∆cab (-4)  -0.002141  0.002788  -0.768049 
∆m2   0.229865  0.118745  1.935784 
∆nef (-5)  -0.004360  0.002161  2.017592 
ect_1   -0.250027  0.141039  -1.772753 
R2 = 0.628; s.e. = 0.0871; F (7, 39) =7.4839[0.00], n = 39 
ARCH F (2, 39) = 1.7034; RESET F (2, 39) = 0.003561[0.9527] 
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The regression results show that a worsening current account (at fourth lag) is leads to the 
depreciation the exchange rate. The key components that are likely to improve the current 
account balance are goods such as tobacco, tea and sugar.  
Similarly, increases in net external inflows as a proportion of GDP (at fifth lag) lead to 
appreciation of the exchange rate. The main components of public capital inflows likely 
to be captured are multilateral and bilateral donor funding. This is an important finding 
and confirms what tends to be observed in practice. 
On the other hand, interest rates have an insignificant impact on exchange rate. This is 
understandable for an economy like Malawi with poor infrastructural services, there is a 
limited capital inflows even in the face of high interest rates. Increases in current money 
supply in the domestic economy results in depreciation of the exchange rate. Likewise, a 
current rise in inflation differentials (that is a rise in domestic prices relative to foreign 
prices) is found to have a depreciating impact on exchange rate movements.  
 
5.3.2 Forecasting Performance and Evaluation of the Forecasts 
In this section, we evaluate the forecasting performance of the fundamental model 
estimated in section (4). The forecasting power of the models is compared to a simple 
random walk process.  The out-of-sample forecasts are measured by two statistics, root 
mean square error (RMSE) and mean absolute error (MAE). Table 5 shows statistics of 
the root mean square error and the mean absolute error for the forecasts of different 
models as well as for the spot rate (the forecast of a random walk model) for different 
time horizons.  
 
The table presents some very interesting findings. It is apparent that the monetary model 
outperforms the random walk at both the 12 and 24 month horizon. What is striking 
however is the performance of the random walk model with a drift. The model 
outperforms the other two models on all the forecast horizons.  
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Table 4 Forecasting Performance metrics 
 
 Forecasts horizon 
 3 months   6 months   12 months 
Random walk (without a drift) 
RMSE 5.45   8.67    12.65 
MAE 4.23   6.84    13.54 
 
Random walk with a Variable Drift 
RMSE 3.76   4.53    7.45 
MAE 2,13   318    6,66 
 
ECM on monetary variables 
RMSE  6.32   7.45    8.56 
MAE  5.07   6.32    7.65 
 
It is apparent that the monetary model outperforms the random walk model on both 6 and 
twelve month horizon. The random walk model with a drift outperforms the other two 
models on all the forecast horizons.  
 
An interesting observation is that the monetary model does not outperform a random walk 
model (without a drift) on the 3-month horizon. To forecast the exchange rate in the short 
term using fundamentals should indeed be more difficult than to forecast in the medium 
and long term. Studies have shown that due to incomplete information in the short term, 
the behaviour of foreign exchange market participants is to a large extent based on 
technical analysis of short term trends or other patterns in the behaviour of the exchange 
rate. The long term behaviour of exchange rate is however more governed by 
fundamentals.  
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Figure 4: Observed and Forecasted MK/US dollar nominal exchange rate 
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In 2007, the average exchange rate depreciation is expected to slow as the current account 
deficits narrows. During the year, the exchange rate is expected to fluctuate according to 
its usual seasonal pattern, although the fluctuations are expected to be smoothen 
somewhat on account of the managed float. Under this, it depreciates in the first quarter 
of the year, ahead of the tobacco auctions and again over the final quarter of the year, 
after the tobacco auctions have closed. Between these periods, the kwacha stabilizes and 
even occasionally appreciates, particularly if this coincides with the timing of donor 
disbursements. However, it is expected to remain vulnerable to sharp falls: potential 
triggers could be a further downturn in tobacco prices. We therefore forecast that the 
kwacha will close the year 2007 at K150/USD in 2007. 
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6.0     Policy Implications and Conclusion 
Exchange rate forecasting has turned out to be quite difficult. It has been difficult to 
challenge findings by Meese and Rogoff (1983a) that the main monetary models perform 
no better in exchange rate forecasting than a simple random walk, has been difficult to 
overturn. 
This study develops a blended version of the monetary and portfolio models for MK/USD 
exchange rate, and in line with works by Meese and Rogoff (1983a), we test the 
forecasting performance of these models against a simple random walk. The results 
indicate the mode performs better than the simple random walk on the 6, 12 and 24 
months forecasting horizon. However, the model does not do well on the 3-month 
horizon, which is supported by theory suggesting that exchange rates are not determined 
by fundamentals in the short term.  
We also add a drift variable to the random walk process and compare its forecasts with 
the other two models. The results show that the random walk with a variable drift model 
performs better than the other models in out-of-sample process. This suggests that the 
random walk (with a variable drift) model is the best tool for exchange rate forecasting in 
the short term and medium term. However, for long term forecasting of exchange rates, a 
fundamental model might still be the best alternative.  
 
Regarding the structural model (with fundamental determinants of nominal exchange 
rate), the empirical results indicate that a worsening current account balance and 
decreases in net external flows result the depreciation of exchange rates. This is in line 
with practical experience.  
On the other hand, higher domestic interest rates have an insignificant impact on 
exchange rate. In an economy with several structural bottlenecks and poor infrastructural 
services, high interest rates cannot be expected to induce capital flows.   A rise in 
domestic inflation is associated with a deprecated exchange rate. Lastly, consistent with 
theoretical expectations, another significant finding is that an easing in monetary policy 
(increase in money supply growth) is associated with a depreciation of the exchange rate. 
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These findings lead us to make the following conclusions. Developments in the current 
account balance have implications on the exchange rate market. Measures aimed at 
improving the current account position, for example through exports, are also 
instrumental in stabilizing the exchange rate – through appreciation. Considering that 
Malawi has been traditionally depending on tobacco as its chief foreign exchange earner, 
and taking into account the anti-smoking campaign militating against the crop amidst low 
prices, it is imperative that Malawi should diversify into other foreign exchange earner 
(for instance tourism) in order to ensure macroeconomic stability, which itself is a pre-
requisite for economic growth and therefore poverty reduction.  Thus, policies that 
influence exports and imports of goods and services also determine exchange rate 
movements. Likewise, prospects concerning funding for a donor aid dependent economy 
like ours may influence the direction of market forces in determining the exchange rate 
movements. Big swings in external funding could cause instability Therefore, 
government’s credibility regarding the use of external public funds and implementation of 
related reforms is important in as far as stability of the foreign exchange market and 
overall macroeconomic stability are concerned.  
 
The insignificant impact of interest rate differential on attracting capital flows calls for the 
need for government to address some structural bottlenecks. For instance, infrastructure 
services such road network and utilities (electricity and water supply) require 
improvement. Otherwise, currently, Malawi needs lower interest rates in order to reduce 
the cost of credit necessary for private sector development.  
 
The general picture from the results is that developments in the external sector of the 
economy, which are not under the ambit of domestic authorities, probably contributed 
more to fluctuations of the Malawi kwacha.  If indeed the above diagnosis is accurate, the 
policy implications of government’s ability in influencing the behavior of the exchange 
rate is limited. This is because the ability of a small economy like that of Malawi to fully 
insulate itself from external shocks is constrained. It will mainly be confined to limiting 
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the contributions of inconsistencies in domestic policy and administering some 
confidence building measures, at least in the short-term-to medium term  
 
It is worthy to note that divergent opinions exist as to the usefulness of devaluation (or 
depreciation) as a policy tool. There are those that believe devaluation as a policy tool can 
boost exports and so crate jobs. It should be noted however that since the kwacha was 
floated in 1994, it has almost been on a depreciating trend almost continuously without 
corresponding gains from exports. Without losing sight of the interest of exporters, it 
should be noted that a depreciated kwacha has implications in terms of increased import 
expenditures (oil import bill), government debt service, domestic inflation and cost of 
imported intermediate inputs. In the short term, what we should strive to have a stable 
Malawi kwacha exchange rate. In the long run, the viable option is in ensuing a 
competitive export market is increased productivity among exporting firms. This may 
include export diversification and implementing measures to limit market imperfections. 
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